Propaganda has become an inescapable feature of the modern media landscape, occupying an increasingly significant portion of public communications and posing a serious threat to the freedom of access to information. According to Britannica, propaganda is the dissemination of information—facts, arguments, rumours, half-truths, or lies—to influence public opinion. With the development of the internet, propaganda can be found everywhere and in any country. That said, the question is not where propaganda can be found, but whether propaganda is the only alternative source of information. Those who engage in propaganda have moved beyond traditional media outlets, and their sayings can now be seen not only on traditional social networks like Facebook or Twitter(X), but also on more popular outlets such as TikTok, where the spread of misinformation mostly targets children.
With this context in mind, we aim to examine the media landscape of one of the most efficient countries in modern propaganda: Russia. To proceed, we will lay out first the context of the Russian propaganda machine. Then, we will explore some examples and cases in which Russia has used media and propaganda against its own citizens, before we conclude with some of the outcomes generated by this situation.
The Rise of Russian Propaganda
Despite its relatively recent development, Russian propaganda has become one of the most sophisticated media systems in the world. It has proven to be highly efficient and effective in a context characterized by the presence of a unipolar source of information, the closure of all independent media, and the domination of a completely state-run television in the country.
One of the main goals of Russian propaganda is to shape public opinion, and the Russian government successfully accomplishes this task. For example, Russia successfully maintains a high percentage of people who believe in the necessity of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the continuation of the war, in part due to the shaping of public opinion engineered by state propaganda.
As a reminder, it is well-known that Russia has a historical monopoly on news sources that dates back to the USSR era. The brief period of freedom of speech that characterized the 1990s came to an end in 2001, with the forcible takeover of NTV, one of the country’s main private television networks. This takeover involved changing the channel’s ownership to a state corporation, firing the entire staff, and hiring new employees.
One of the methods of shaping public opinion employed by the Kremlin is the creation of a context characterized by difficult access to the few independent media outlets that still prevail in Russia. Recent studies suggest that 63% of Russians turn on the television at least once a day. Given that all news channels are directly owned by the state or state corporations, this allows for a unipolar portrayal of any news story. Without alternative viewpoints, propaganda can easily persuade people to believe specific distorted facts that lack research support or factual basis, thus eliminating the need to defend its claims.
However, Russian propaganda extends beyond the domestic, Russian-speaking market. The Kremlin actively seeks international support abroad through outlets like Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik. Additionally, recent reports suggest connections between RT and Russian intelligence, reinforcing the view that these platforms are integral to a broader global strategy aimed at shaping public opinions to align with Russian interests.
Three Case Studies of Russian Propaganda
There are many cases that illustrate how Russian propaganda is designed to control public opinion of internal and external events.
First, the case of the defense briefings and misleading reports. One of the most striking cases probably lies in the case of the regular briefings given since 2022 by the Ministry of Defense spokesperson, General Igor Konashenkov, which are broadcast on state television. Research suggests that positive news coverage can have a significant impact on maintaining public support for government actions. Thus, the main goal of these briefings is to convince the public that the war in Ukraine is progressing successfully, with Russia achieving continuous victories. Konashenkov’s briefings report mainly on the number of Ukrainian soldiers killed, military equipment destroyed, and territories captured, but they often contain misleading or incorrect information. For instance, at the beginning of the war in 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed to have shot down so many aircrafts that the total number exceeded 110% of the entire Ukrainian air fleet. Thus, such reports with daily positive news have turned into a tactic of repetition.
Besides, due to the fluid nature of the conflict, reporting the capture of new areas is not always feasible. Consequently, the Ministry of Defense often employs a tactic of repetition. For instance, the town of Kreminna, with a population of 18,000, was reported as captured on March 2, 2022. Yet, on March 7, it was announced again that control over Kreminna had been established, followed by another report on March 8 stating that troops had advanced 8 kilometers and recaptured the town. Over 50 similar instances of repeated reports have been observed during the briefings. The sheer volume of information makes it difficult for viewers to detect these inconsistencies. This strategy enables the Russian military to present significant achievements daily, thereby sustaining public trust and support for its operations.
Second, Russian disinformation related to Western weapons leaking to the black market. Russian propaganda is indeed at work as we can see with the example of the numerous publications and statements made by government officials regarding leaks of American weapons supplied to Ukraine onto the black market. These statements aimed at questioning the necessity of arms deliveries to Ukraine, to increase Western voters’ concerns about the feasibility of synch supplies, and to promote a theory that claimed incompetence of the Ukrainian government.
An example of such disinformation was a statement made by Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, who claimed that American anti-tank grenade launchers (RPGs) had been sold on the black market to pro-Palestinian groups and used against Israel. Later, Russian pro-government media repeatedly spread similar claims that Western weapons had entered the black market through Ukraine. These claims were repeatedly proven false by former Defense official Celeste Wallander during her testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on arms supplies to Ukraine in 2023. Similarly, another top Pentagon official, Lt. General Douglas Sims, had stated in 2022 that there were no reports that weapons had gone missing from Ukraine. The EU spokesperson for foreign affairs and security policy, Peter Stano, had also noted in July 2022 that claims of Ukraine allegedly reselling Western weapons were Russian propaganda. Later, these statements were also refuted by independent journalist’s investigations.
Finally, when it comes to biological weapons, another telling example of Russian propaganda can be found in a statement made by Russia’s permanent representative, Vasily Nebenzya, at a UN Security Council meeting in October 2022. Nebenzya claimed then, with no clear evidence, that Ukraine was developing biological weapons together with the United States in the form of drones filled with “combat mosquitoes” capable of infecting Russian soldiers with dangerous diseases. His quote was repeatedly broadcast on state television, promoting the idea that the invasion of Ukraine was fully justified and necessary. However, no international institute or organization has been able to confirm Nebenzya’s claim since then – not even within Russia. And, once again, no rectifications were issued by the state media.
These examples represent just a few of the many instances of the Russian government’s use of fake news. Combined with the state’s media monopoly, they enable the construction of an alternative reality for the Russian audience—one in which everyone else is an enemy, and only Russia upholds truth, righteousness, and justice.
Strategies for Countering Russian Propaganda and Promoting Independent Information
Unfortunately, countering propaganda in Russia is exceedingly challenging due to the country’s isolation and stringent media laws. However, positive inspiring examples do exist when it comes to combating Russian propaganda globally. Sweden, for instance, created an ad hoc unit within the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) to tackle disinformation. It employs a comprehensive approach, based on state-media cooperation, education for children, and international cooperation. MSB works with social media platforms to detect and report misleading content. Besides, in the education field, Sweden has adopted a media literacy program to teach students skills that help them recognize fake news and disinformation. These strategies were successful in countering Russian propaganda during the 2017 election in Sweden. But this does not mean that they were sufficient to counter Russia’s propaganda strategies globally.
Besides, obviously, it is rather unlikely that Russia will employ a similar tactic: it needs to use propaganda and disinformation to enhance its global position. However, there are several potential ways to influence the Russian information space and make information accessible to the Russian audience. One such example is social media, since information from Instagram, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter) is difficult for state censorship to control due to the large number of independent content creators. Therefore, sponsoring independent Russian media and supporting their activities through social media could help break through the information bubble of Russian disinformation. One historical example could be the broadcasting of “Voice of America” in the USSR. Through this radio station, Soviet listeners had the opportunity to access an alternative source of information different from the state narrative. A second potential solution would consist in developing ways to moderate Russian news agencies on social media platforms. A successful example of this is YouTube’s blocking of Russian propaganda media channels, which significantly reduced the level of disinformation in the Russian-language space. Also, the blocking of Russian state television channels abroad, in Germany and the United Kingdom, has reduced the Russian government’s ability to spread false information outside of the country. But the question is whether these steps would end up having an influence on the Russian public opinion directly. So far, this scenario sounds limited.
Conclusion
The examples we reviewed provide only a brief insight into the mechanisms of Russian propaganda. When false or misleading information is disseminated, viewers lack generally the means to access true facts and information or consider alternative perspectives. As a result, these factors collectively reshape Russian audiences’ perception of reality, securing the high level of support for the state’s foreign policy.
While some citizens still receive information from alternative sources thanks to their use of VPNs, unfortunately, this option ends up not being accessible to everyone due to its complexity and cost. Additionally, the Russian government has started cracking down on VPNs, thereby attempting to isolate the last remaining access to outside sources of information available to the Russian audience. Overall, at present, Russian propaganda is working extremely effectively on the domestic scene. To counter this situation efficiently, a collective effort from independent media, international institutions, and democratic countries is needed. Otherwise, the spread of Russian disinformation could become pervasive, and with the experience gained from targeting its own citizens, this campaign could pose a significant threat to democratic nations.
Mekhanoshin Semen is a Master student at the School of International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University, USA
To quote this article, please use the following reference: Mekhanoshin (2025), “Pervasive Propaganda: How Russian Media Strategies Mislead Citizens and the World” https://crisesobservatory.es/pervasive-propaganda-how-russian-media-strategies-mislead-citizens-and-the-world/
The OCC publishes a wide range of opinions that are meant to help our readers think of International Relations. This publication reflects the views only of the author, and neither the OCC nor Saint Louis University can be held responsible for any use which may be made of the opinion of the author and/or the information contained therein.
Featured image generated by AI.